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Note
Morally Hazardous Chemical Regulations: Why
Effective Reform of the TSCA Requires
Reduction of the Toxic Data Gap
John Kvinge*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Most Americans had no idea, until relatively recently, that they were
living so dangerously. . . . They had no idea that, without their
knowledge or consent, they were often engaging in a grim game of
chemical roulette whose result they would not know until many years
later.1

Many Americans believe that if a chemical is sold or used
within the United States, it must have gone through an
extensive battery of tests to determine its effects on health and
the environment. Although the chemical industry is one of the
most heavily regulated in the United States, our actual
knowledge about many of its products is shockingly small.
Until recently, the EPA had a full set of health and safety data
for less than seven percent of the chemicals produced in or
imported into the United States in quantities in excess of one
million pounds per year.2 While recent voluntary efforts by the
industry have filled some of the gaps in our knowledge, the
picture is far from complete. These chemicals are found in our
homes, our offices, our children’s toys, and in shockingly high
quantities within our own bodies.3 The Toxic Substances
© 2011 John Kvinge.
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2008, Iowa
State University.
1. Dr. Russell E. Train, Former Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency 1973-77, as
quoted in S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 3 (1976).
2. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA
AVAILABILITY STUDY 2 (1998).
3. See generally U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FOURTH NATIONAL
REPORT ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS (2010) (finding
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Control Act (TSCA) was created in 1976 to give the EPA the
power to investigate and regulate chemicals that were not
covered by other laws.4 As an attempt to require testing of
chemicals before they enter the stream of commerce, the TSCA
has been largely a failure. It appears that Congress will
attempt to reform or modernize the TSCA in the near future,
and everyone—from government officials to industry executives
and citizen activists—have proposed their thoughts on what
the reform should look like.5
This Note aims to examine the toxic data gap that has
resulted from the ineffective TSCA and seeks to identify the
features of an effective reform that would solve the data gap.
Part I of this Note covers the history of the TSCA and compares
some of its shortfalls to the European Union’s recently enacted
regulatory system. Part II of this Note presents several
proposals that would improve our knowledge of the chemicals
in commerce. This Note concludes that the most important
feature of any proposed reform is the provisions that give the
EPA the power to force manufacturers to conduct testing before
they market a chemical, and reset the TSCA inventory to give
Americans a realistic picture of the chemical dangers present in
their everyday life.

measureable levels of 212 environmental chemicals in tissue samples of test
subjects).
4. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 1 (listing the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the
Consumer Product Safety Act as examples of other health statutes; and
stating, “The bill is designed to fill a number of regulatory gaps which
currently exist”).
5. See, e.g., AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, 10 PRINCIPLES FOR
MODERNIZING
TSCA
(2009),
available
at
http://www.americanchemistry.com/TSCAPrinciples (follow “download PDF”
hyperlink); SAFER CHEMS., HEALTHY FAMILIES COALITION, A PLATFORM FOR
REFORM OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (2009), available at
http://www.saferchemicals.org/PDF/SCHF_Campaign_Platform.pdf;
U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM OF CHEMICALS
MANAGEMENT
LEGISLATION
(2009),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/existingchemicals/pubs/principles.pdf; COALITION FOR
CHEMICAL
SAFETY,
ISSUES
AND
POLICY,
http://www.coalitionforchemsafety.com/issues.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
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II. HISTORY OF THE TSCA AND OTHER REGULATORY
SCHEMES
A. ENACTING THE TSCA
Title I of the Toxic Substances Control Act became law on
October 11, 1976.6 Congress intended the legislation to serve as
a method “to regulate chemical substances that present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”7
Afterwards, Congress enacted titles II through IV to deal with
specific toxic threats through the expansion of EPA power
under the TSCA.8 The TSCA was not the first federal program
created to control pollution and hazardous substances, but was
rather intended as a gap-filler that would focus on toxic
chemicals produced in large quantities that evaded federal
control under other pollution and health measures.9 Initially,
the targets of the TSCA were polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)
and other workplace chemical hazards such as kepone, vinyl
chloride, and asbestos.10
A primary goal of the TSCA is the collection of test data
about health and environmental effects caused by the
chemicals marketed in the country.11 Congress expected that
the provisions of the TSCA would force chemical manufacturers
to be the primary information producing entity, and the EPA
would act to collect and organize the results of the tests.12 To
facilitate collection of comprehensive data, and appease
industry opposition to a wholesale regulatory scheme, the final
bill included many concessions that limited the EPA’s power to
institute regulations in the absence of substantial evidence of a
“reasonable basis to conclude” that a chemical “will present an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.”13
Furthermore, any resulting regulations must be the “least
6. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat.
2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2003)).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2).
8. The three subtitles deal with, respectively: Asbestos Hazard
Emergency Response, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2656; Indoor Radon Abatement, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2661-2671 and Lead Exposure Reduction, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2681-2692.
9. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 1.
10. Id. at 4.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (“[A]dequate data should be developed with
respect to the effect of chemical substances and mixtures . . . development of
such data should be the responsibility of [manufacturers].”)
12. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 2.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
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burdensome” possible.14 In practice, the EPA has been unable
to institute regulations based on these criteria.15
B. SPLITTING THE UNIVERSE
To facilitate testing and cataloguing chemical health and
safety risks, the TSCA split the universe of chemicals into two
distinct categories: chemicals currently in production at the
time the law took effect (existing chemicals) and potential new
chemicals that companies were considering manufacturing for
the first time.16 Existing chemicals became part of the TSCA
inventory, and absent a specific regulation, any company was
free to produce or import that chemical provided they complied
with other laws. Furthermore, no testing was required for
existing chemicals.17 The TSCA inventory initially contained
about 61,000 “existing” chemicals reported to the EPA by
manufacturers between 1975 and 1978.18 New chemicals (other
than those for exempted uses) undergo a review process, and if
the EPA does not find a reason to regulate or prohibit them,
they are added to the inventory.19
The process of adding a non-exempt new chemical to the
TSCA inventory starts with a Pre-Manufacture Notice (PMN).
A PMN must be completed at least ninety days before the
manufacturer intends to begin importing or producing the
chemical.20 The PMN requires basic information about
chemical properties, uses, production levels, and expected

14. Id.
15. Of the more than 83,000 chemicals contained in the TSCA inventory,
the EPA has placed controls on only nine under TSCA. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION: OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 10 (2009).
16. See David Brownfield, Reform of U.S. Chemicals Regulations May Not
Be out of REACH, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 223, 227
(2008).
17. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION:
APPROACHES IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 4
(2005); see also Sarah Bayko, Reforming the Toxic Substances Control Act to
Protect America’s Most Precious Resource, 14 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 245,
266 (2006) (noting that the EPA “required testing for fewer than 200” of the
62,000 chemicals in commerce when the EPA began reviewing chemicals).
18. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW: OFFICE OF POLLUTION
PREVENTION AND TOXICS PROGRAMS 5 (2007).
19. Id. at 8.
20. Id. at 7.
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exposures.21 Additionally, the manufacturer must provide any
health and safety data, but only to the extent that the data is
in their possession or “reasonably ascertainable.”22 This is the
greatest criticism of the TSCA and its ultimate downfall.23
Because there are no minimum health and safety tests required
prior to marketing a new chemical under TSCA, most
manufacturers choose not to conduct any testing, and submit
their PMN absent any test data at all. In 2005, about fifteen
percent of PMNs included a full set of basic toxicity data for
health and safety.24
If the PMN includes less than a full set of data, the options
available to the EPA during the 90-day review process are
significantly limited. Although the EPA has the ability to
request additional testing on a product it believes may pose a
threat to health or the environment, in order to make that
request, the EPA must have enough information that
demonstrates a potential risk or extensive exposure.25 In the
instances where a PMN is submitted without any testing,
making even an initial determination of risk or exposure is
extremely difficult. Since the TSCA was enacted in 1976, the
EPA has required additional testing for only 200 chemicals.26
When possible, the EPA relies on Structure-Activity
Relationship analysis to attempt to predict the physical
properties and health and environment effects of an untested
chemical.27 Each year, the EPA receives around 1500 PMNs,28
and about half of the chemicals identified enter production and

21. Id.
22. U.S.

GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION:
COMPARISON OF U.S. AND RECENTLY ENACTED EUROPEAN UNION APPROACHES
TO PROTECT AGAINST THE RISKS OF TOXIC CHEMICALS 7 (2007).
23. See Rachel Rawlins, Teething on Toxins: In Search of Regulatory
Solutions for Toys and Cosmetics, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (2009).
24. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION:
OPTIONS EXIST TO IMPROVE EPA’S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND
MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 11 (2005).
25. See Richard A. Denison, Ten Essential Elements in TSCA Reform, 39
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10020, 10020 (2009) (“In what amounts to a
classic Catch-22, government must already have information sufficient to
document potential risk, or at the very least, extensive exposure, in order to
require the development of information sufficient to determine whether there
is actual risk.”).
26. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 15.
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id.
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enter the TSCA inventory.29 The other half are voluntarily
withdrawn, frequently following the threat of EPA action.30
Today, the inventory contains upwards of 82,000 distinct
chemicals.31
C. GAPS IN THE KNOWLEDGE
Although the TSCA database is large, it is far from
comprehensive. A majority of the chemicals it contains are
“existing” chemicals left over from the initial population of the
inventory in 1976.32 Many of these chemicals are no longer in
production, and have been replaced by (hopefully) safer and
more effective alternatives.33 In 1998, the EPA released a study
on High Production Volume (HPV) chemicals.34 HPV chemicals
are produced or imported into the United States in excess of
1,000,000 lbs per year.35 The EPA identified nearly 3000 HPV
chemicals, and concluded that no publicly-available toxicity
information existed for 43% of the HPV chemicals, and a full
set of basic toxicity data existed for only 7%.36 In an effort to
remedy this shocking knowledge deficit, the EPA and chemical
industry completed the HPV Challenge, an effort to create data
for more than 2,200 of the HPV chemicals.37 As the program
reaches its conclusion in 2010, evaluation of its success is
mixed. The EPA portrays the challenge as a huge success, but
critics point to the remaining gaps in data and lack of
transparency in reporting results.38
Even if the EPA has a full picture of what applications of
its product a chemical producer anticipates at the time the
chemical is added to the TSCA inventory, there can be
29. Id. at 10 tbl.1.3.
30. Id. at 9–11.
31. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 2.
32. Id.
33. The EPA admits that it does not have a complete picture of what
chemicals are actually used in the country. A plan was created to reset the
inventory, but it was put on hold pending a serious overhaul of the TSCA. See
TSCA
Inventory
Reset,
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT.
AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/champ/pubs/hpv/tsca.html (last updated Apr. 29, 2010).
34. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 2.
35. See id. at 2.
36. Id.
37. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 30–33.
38. See RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND’S
COMMENTS ON CHAMP 5 (2008).
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significant changes over time, as different uses are discovered,
or different end-users begin incorporating the chemical in their
business.39 To attempt to gauge these changes and update the
inventory, the EPA created the Inventory Update Rule (IUR) in
1977 using its section 8(a) powers under the TSCA.40 The EPA
has since amended the IUR, the most recent change coming
into effect in 2006.41 The IUR presently requires manufacturers
producing 25,000 pounds or more of certain chemicals to
provide basic manufacturing information to the EPA every five
years.42 Manufacturers producing more than 300,000 pounds
have additional reporting requirements.43 In a problem that
mirrors the initial reporting requirements for PMNs, IUR
reports only require information that the manufacturers
consider is “readily obtainable.”44 In the 2006 IUR summary, of
the 2118 chemicals that reported commercial or consumer uses,
814 claimed determining if their product was intended for
children was “Not Readily Obtainable.”45 The EPA readily
admits that because of “Not Readily Obtainable” responses,
“the reported industrial processing and use information
represents an undercounting of the actual processing and use
situations in the United States.”46 Furthermore, “companies
reporting under the IUR might have incomplete knowledge of
the processing and/or use of their chemicals.”47 If the producers
of a chemical do not have a complete picture of how their
product is being used, it seems unlikely that someone else does.
D. PARALYZED WITH (A LACK OF) DOUBT
The data gap is not only dangerous because of the lack of
practical knowledge, but it causes significant headaches for the
EPA when attempting to promulgate regulations on chemicals
that it has good reason to suspect are dangerous. Two
frequently-quoted examples come from the judicial decisions in

39. See generally Denison, supra note 25, at 10024-26.
40. TSCA Inventory Reset, supra note 33.
41. See Denison, supra note 25, at 10024-25.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2006 INVENTORY UPDATE REPORTING:
DATA SUMMARY 31 (2008).
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id.
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Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA48 and Corrosion
Proof Fittings v. EPA.49 In both cases, the Fifth Circuit ruled
that the EPA had insufficient data to justify the action they
were taking—requiring testing for isopropyl benzene in
Chemical Manufacturers and banning asbestos in Corrosion
Proof.
In Chemical Manufacturers, although manufacturers and
processors released nearly three million pounds of isopropyl
benzene into the atmosphere each year, and produced more
than three billion pounds of the chemical each year, very little
was known about the carcinogenic effects of the chemical.50
Because isopropyl benzene was “produced in substantial
quantities,” and its use created the “potential for substantial
human exposure.” The EPA issued a final test rule that
required manufacturers to perform testing on “health effects,
environmental effects, and chemical fate.”51 The chemical
manufacturers sued, and the Fifth Circuit agreed that the EPA
had not articulated a standard to determine when exposure to
isopropyl benzene was “substantial.”52 As a result, before the
EPA can require additional data, they must set a standard for
exposure, but before the EPA can set a standard for exposure,
they need additional data.53 The high burden of proof that must
be met to promulgate a rule, combined with the underreporting
of information from the manufacturers meant the EPA
essentially was unable to require manufactures to conduct tests
against their will.54
Corrosion Proof Fittings spelled the end of the EPA’s
attempts to institute significant rulemaking efforts that are not
explicitly supported by industry.55 Although the EPA based
their ban on asbestos on more than “45,000 pages of analyses,
comments, testimony, correspondence, and other materials,”56
48. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 899 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1990).
49. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
50. Cumene; Final Test Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 28195, 28196 (July 27, 1988)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 799).
51. Id. at 28195.
52. 899 F.2d at 360.
53. See Robert B. Haemer, Reform of the Toxic Substances Control Act:
Achieving Balance in the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 99,
116 (1999).
54. Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 18.
55. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 18-20.
56. Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in
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the Fifth Circuit largely vacated the rule on the basis that “the
EPA has failed to support its ban with the substantial evidence
needed to provide it with a reasonable basis.”57 After such
significant and costly setbacks, it is perhaps unsurprising that
in the thirty-three year history of the TSCA, the EPA has
banned only five of the substances originally contained on the
inventory, and placed controls on four new chemicals under
section 5(f).58
This article opened with a quote by Dr. Russell E. Train,
the administrator of the EPA during the inception of the TSCA.
The Senate cited Dr. Train’s comments about the ignorance of
Americans regarding the dangers of chemicals present in their
everyday life as a strong motivation for the passage of the
TSCA.59 Sadly, it appears thirty-three years later the situation
has not significantly improved, and most Americans assume
that because a chemical is allowed to be produced in the
country, it must have passed a battery of tests to prove its
safety. While this is true for a number of substances, such as
pesticides, drugs, food, and cosmetics, these categories do not
cover even a majority of the chemicals that Americans come in
contact with on a daily basis. The regulatory gap that spawned
the TSCA remains today.
The controversy over Bisphenol A (BPA) in 2008 is a
perfect example of the faith the American people have in the
regulatory ability of the US government, and their shock when
they realize how little regulation actually occurs. Produced in
quantities exceeding two billion pounds in 2004, BPA is
frequently used in the manufacture of polycarbonate and epoxy
resins.60 The chemical entered the national lexicon in 2008
when it became known that the FDA had ignored significant
safety concerns when evaluating the health effects of BPA that
leeched into food and beverages from plastic containers.61
Commerce Prohibitions; Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 29460, 29461 (July 12, 1989)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763).
57. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1226 (5th Cir. 1991).
The ban is still effective with regard to new products using asbestos. See U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 19.
58. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 15, at 10 n.3.
59. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 3 (1976).
60. See Bisphenol A Global Indus. Grp., Bisphenol A: Information Sheet
(October
2002),
http://www.bisphenola.org/pdf/DiscoveryandUseOctober2002.pdf.
61. See, e.g., Julie Scelfo, F.D.A. to Reconsider Plastic Bottle Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, at D3.
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Consumer backlash against products containing BPA led the
six largest manufacturers of baby bottles to offer BPA free
versions of their products, and led to a ban on BPA in children’s
products in Canada and several states.62
Furthermore, while the TSCA has one of the largest
universes of chemicals to regulate, it has one of the smallest
staffs and budgets of federal regulatory programs.63 As a point
of comparison, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) regulates approximately 700
pesticides used in America each year.64 The FIFRA operates on
a licensing scheme, where a producer must prove safety of their
product and be granted a license before the EPA allows
distribution. In 2008, the Office of Pollution Prevention and
Toxics (which administers the TSCA) had an operating budget
of about $50 million for TSCA activity, and a staff of about 270
people.65 Also in 2008, the FIFRA, in contrast, had a budget of
about $160 million and a staff of over 900 people.66 The FIFRA
has a budget over three times greater to police a chemical
universe less than one percent of the size of the TSCA.67
E. OTHER EXAMPLES
The European Union recently enacted legislation known as
Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals
(REACH).68 It took effect on June 1, 2007, and in many ways,
represents the antithesis of the TSCA program.69 Unlike the
TSCA, REACH creates no distinction between “new” and
“existing” chemicals; every chemical produced or imported into

62. See Denise Grady & Gardiner Harris, U.S. Concerned About The Risks
From A Plastic, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, at A3.
63. See Mark A. Greenwood, TSCA Reform: Building a Program that can
Work, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 10034, 10036
(2009).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Lynn L. Bergeson, Chemical Regulation: Preparing to Address the
Challenges Ahead, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS (SPECIAL ISSUE)10029
(2009). See generally European Commission Environment Directorate General,
REACH in Brief (2007).
69. See John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH: Practical
Principles for Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 741–44
(2008).
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the EU in sufficient quantities faces the same regulatory
process.70 Because REACH is based on the chemicals that are
actually used in the EU, its universe is expected to be
significantly smaller, around 30,000 unique substances, or just
a little over a third of the size of the TSCA inventory.71
According to the quantity of the chemical produced and its
known hazards, every manufacturer must submit technical
data along with their request for registration.72 Chemicals
known to be safe, and those produced in small quantities have
the lowest reporting requirement, but manufacturers are still
required to produce detailed information about the chemical
properties, expected uses, and safe handling requirements for
their product.73 Chemicals produced in larger quantities, and
those that present biological or environmental hazards are
required to undergo significant testing before REACH will
authorize their use.74 Further requirements are in place for
downstream users to report their uses to their suppliers, and
REACH encourages information sharing among governments
and industry to create a complete picture of the exposure and
uses present for each chemical.75 REACH also includes
significant regulatory authority, requiring evaluation and
authorization for most chemicals before they reach the
market.76 REACH places the burden on manufacturers, for the
most part, to prove their product’s safety before distribution is
allowed.77 According to some estimates, high production volume
chemicals (100 metric tons or more) will have to undergo an
average of forty-eight tests before marketing under REACH,
compared to just fourteen voluntary tests under the TSCA.78

70. Id. at 743–44.
71. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE GENERAL,
supra note 68, at 9.
72. See Applegate, supra note 69, at 744–45.
73. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE GENERAL,
supra note 68, at 6–10.
74. REACH encourages non-animal testing to the extent possible, and
encourages companies with similar chemicals to pool resources and share
data. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE GENERAL,
supra note 68, at 10.
75. EUROPEAN COMMISSION ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE GENERAL, supra
note 68, at 8, 11.
76. See Applegate, supra note 69, at 744.
77. Applegate, supra note 69, at 745–46.
78. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 22, at 17.
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F. CALLS FOR REFORM
Although calls for reform of the TSCA have been present
for nearly all of its thirty-three year history, there has never
been a significant revision to the substance of the TSCA.79 The
last significant attempt was the Kid Safe Chemical Act (KSCA),
proposed in 2005 by Senators Frank Lautenberg and Jim
Jeffords.80 The KSCA would have given the EPA additional
power to use the TSCA to regulate the industry to protect
sensitive sub-populations, especially children, from exposure to
chemicals that were known to be hazardous or that had not
been significantly tested.81 Replacing the “unreasonable risk”
standard, the KSCA would have allowed the EPA to regulate
chemicals that did not present a “reasonable certainty of no
harm.”82 Critics of the reform dismissed this standard as
unworkable and unattainable.83
With the change in leadership in Washington in 2009, talk
began again about the necessity of reforming or modernizing
the TSCA. On September 29, 2009, EPA Administrator Lisa P.
Jackson released a document entitled “Essential Principles for
Reform of Chemicals Management Legislation.”84 In her speech
at the California Commonwealth Club announcing the
principals,
Administrator
Jackson
acknowledged
the
shortcomings of the current implementation of the TSCA and
asked Congress to come up with legislation to resolve those
problems.85
Industry has also been a vocal proponent of modernization
of the TSCA. Coinciding with the EPA’s drive for reform, the
American Chemistry Council released its own set of ten
79. Greenwood, supra note 63, at 10034 (“TSCA is one of the oldest
federal environmental statutes that has never seen substantial reform.”).
80. Kid Safe Chemicals Act, S. 1391, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4308, 109th
Cong. (2005).
81. See S. 1391§ 2(b).
82. S. 1391 § 503(a)(1).
83. See, e.g., SOC’Y OF CHEM. MFRS. AND ASSOCIATES, SOCMA POSITION
ON REFORMING THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (2009), available at
http://www.socma.com/assets/file/socma1/PDFfiles/GR_PDF_files/SOCMAPosition-on-TSCA-031909.pdf (describing the reasonable certainty of no harm
standard as “arguably . . . impossible to meet”).
84. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 5.
85. Adm’r Lisa P. Jackson, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Remarks to the
Commonwealth Club of San Francisco (Sept. 29, 2009) (transcript available on
EPA web site).
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principles for modernizing the TSCA.86 Notably, the American
Chemistry Council supports a regulatory scheme that requires
manufacturers to conduct additional testing to allow the EPA
to make confident decisions about safety.87 Composed of over
150 businesses, trade organizations, and manufactures, the
Coalition for Chemical Safety represents the strongest industry
voice calling for reform.88 According to the Coalition for
Chemical Safety Blog, they have four guiding principles that all
of the members agree upon: “[1.] Our country is long past due
for an overhaul of its chemical safety laws; [2.] Any such
overhaul should put safety first; [3.] It should also be a law that
encourages American industrial innovation; and, [4.] It should
protect American jobs.”89
Thus with support from government, industry, and
citizens, it is only a matter of time before a proposal is brought
before Congress. In the meantime, the EPA has been testing
the limits of its authority, establishing a “chemicals of concern”
list and action plans that may place restrictions on phthalates,
short-chain chlorinated paraffins, polybrominated diphenyl
ethers (PBDEs), and perfluorinated chemicals.90 The EPA has
also been encouraging manufacturers of other dangerous
chemicals to voluntarily phase out use and distribution.91
III. ANALYSIS
As Congress holds hearings on reform and toxic chemicals,
it is important to consider the essential elements of a reform
that would give the EPA the necessary authority and oversight
to ensure that the chemicals in the United States are safe and
effective. If any reform is going to be effective, it has to learn
from the mistakes of the past and remedy the shortfalls of the
current version of the TSCA.
86. AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, supra note 5.
87. Id.
88. See generally About Us, COALITION FOR CHEMICAL SAFETY,
http://coalitionforchemsafety.com/aboutus.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2010)
(describing the organization and providing a list of Coalition members).
89. Who
is
CCS?,
COALITION
FOR
CHEMICAL
SAFETY,
http://blog.coalitionforchemsafety.com/2010/02/who-is-ccs/ (last visited Sept. 6,
2010).
90. Elizabeth Grossman, What the EPA’s “Chemicals of Concern” Plans
Really
Mean,
SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN
(Jan.
11,
2010),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=epa-chemicals-of-concernplans.
91. See id.
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First, reform must reset the chemical inventory and ensure
that no chemical is given a free pass solely because it is already
in production. Second, a reformed TSCA should place the
primary burden on manufacturers to prove the safety of their
product by imposing requirements for minimum initial testing
before a substance is added to the inventory and approved for
sale. Third, the data that results from increased testing must
be shared with states and other agencies so that they can
determine what, if any, additional regulations are required to
keep us safe. Fourth, a reformed TSCA must provide benefits to
manufacturers who conduct sufficient testing and produce
innovative and safe chemicals for consumer and industrial use.
Finally, the TSCA must establish a standard of review that
takes advantage of the new influx of information and allows for
flexibility in regulation.
A. FIRST STEPS: IT MAKES SENSE TO RESET THE CHEMICAL
INVENTORY, AND PRIORITIZE THE EPA’S INVESTIGATION
In 1976, there were approximately 61,000 existing
chemicals in commerce when the TSCA came into effect.92 As
existing chemicals, no additional testing was required before
companies who manufactured these chemicals began to
distribute their product, often in shockingly large quantities.93
While a lot has changed over the last thirty-four years, the
inventory has not been updated to reflect these changes.94 Over
20,000 new chemicals have been added to the inventory, and
other chemicals that were in wide use during the 1970s have
dropped out of use completely.95 As a method for explaining the
number and types of chemicals that are in actual use in the
United States today, the TSCA inventory is a complete failure.
A primary element that will be a part of any successful
reform of the TSCA is an inventory reset. An inventory reset is
not a new proposal.96 The EPA announced a plan to reset the
inventory in March of 2008 but discontinued the plan when it
became apparent that a complete overhaul of the system was in
92. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 5.
93. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 4, 7, 11.
94. Jackson, supra note 85.
95. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BACKGROUND DISCUSSION PIECE: EPA’S
TSCA
INVENTORY
RESET
1,
3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/champ/pubs/hpv/INV_Reset_112508.pdf.
96. Id.
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the works.97 By purging the TSCA inventory and re-creating a
new inventory that reflects the actual and intended uses of
chemicals that are produced in or imported into the United
States, the EPA will actually be able to reduce its workload
when it comes time to evaluate the chemicals contained in a
new inventory. All manufacturers and importers should be
required to provide a list of all chemicals that they are
producing, using, or importing in a given period (perhaps three
years as was used for the original TSCA inventory) along with
an approximate quantity of each chemical. In this way, the
EPA will be able to prioritize their investigations based on the
quantity of the substance in use in a given year. Old substances
that are no longer in use have no place in the inventory. If a
company wishes to use a discontinued substance in the future,
they will be required to provide testing data for the chemical
just as if it is a new discovery.
An inventory reset might be combined with a sunset clause
on any chemical that is not used for more than a decade to
ensure that the new TSCA inventory remains relevant. As time
passes, we learn more about risks from substances that were
considered harmless in the past.98 Without continual
monitoring of the substances we produce and release, their
hazardous effects on our body and our environment take us by
surprise.
The biggest advantage of an inventory reset would be the
opportunity for the EPA to take another bite at the apple of
regulation for some specific chemicals. Many of the 61,000
original chemicals are no longer produced and have not been
evaluated for health and safety in the last decade, but a
company could decide tomorrow to once again begin
manufacturing the chemical in large quantities.99 Assuming
they were not going to use the chemical for a new purpose, the
EPA would not have any significant ability to require new
testing or prevent the company from going forward because the
substance is already contained on the TSCA inventory.
An inventory reset and retesting requirement would not be
a heavy burden on industry either. Thanks to the success of the
EPA’s High Production Volume Challenge, most companies
97. Id.
98. For a particularly shocking tale about the hazards of a popular
microwaveable snack, see Andrew Scott Dulberg, The Popcorn Lung Case
Study: A Recipe for Regulation?, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 87 (2009).
99. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 95.
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have relatively complete data about the health and safety
effects of their most common products.100 Additionally, because
the European Union will have had their REACH program in
effect for nearly half a decade by the time new legislation would
take effect, most of the chemicals will have been tested under
the REACH standards for safety already.101 In the current
system, companies that refuse to test or that under-test their
products are given a huge benefit, while companies that are
committed to fully ensuring the safety of their product spend
millions on testing and are only rewarded with more regulatory
hoops to jump through.102 An effective regulatory program
should not encourage willful ignorance about health and safety,
regardless of how long a product has been on the market.
B. SHIFTING THE BURDEN: A REFORMED TSCA SHOULD PLACE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVE SAFETY IN THE HANDS OF THE
MANUFACTURER, BY REQUIRING MANUFACTURERS TO CONDUCT
INITIAL TESTING OF THEIR PRODUCT
Under the current system, manufacturers are not required
to conduct product testing before submitting their application
to the EPA.103 Because the EPA relies in part on the data sent
by a manufacturer to determine if there are health or safety
concerns that warrant additional testing, manufacturers who
believe they might have a dangerous product are actually given
incentives not to test under the current system.104 While the
EPA has the ability to test a product themselves, they do not
have the resources or the knowledge of a manufacturer, and at
current funding levels would not be capable of testing every
product submitted to them.105
From a logistical standpoint, it makes the most sense to
have manufacturers conduct their own testing. Manufacturers
have the greatest interest in seeing their product come on the
market, and they also have the best idea about the intended
uses for their product and how much they intend to produce.
Requiring manufacturers to conduct tests would equitably
100. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 18, at 30–33.
101. See Bergeson, supra note 68, at 10030.
102. See Wendy Wagner, Using Competition-Based Regulation to Bridge
the Toxics Data Gap, 83 IND. L.J. 629, 630 (2008).
103. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 11.
104. See Wagner, supra note 102, at 630.
105. See Greenwood, supra note 63, at 10036.
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distribute the cost of comprehensive testing between the
manufacturers who produce the product and the companies
who use the chemicals in the greatest quantity.
From a legal standpoint, some courts have recently held
that manufacturers have a duty to test their product under the
common law—apart from the extremely limited duties imposed
by the TSCA. The Fifth Circuit has been the most vocal
proponent of common law responsibility to test, stating that “a
manufacturer has a duty to test and inspect his product. . . . A
product must not be made available to the public without
disclosure of those dangers that the application of reasonable
foresight would reveal.”106 Unfortunately, proving that a
manufacturer has violated their common law duty to test is
more difficult when the manufacturer completes insufficient
testing, because first a plaintiff must prove that they were
damaged by the product, which is nearly impossible without
full testing.107
A common concern those opposed to mandatory testing
have is control over trade secrets and confidentiality.108
Producers claim that in the process of providing all of the
health and safety data to the EPA they would be forced to
divulge trade secrets that would give their competitors an
unfair advantage. According to some estimates, nearly 95% of
Potential Manufacture Notices include significant restrictions
on the data they contain because they are identified as
confidential business information.109 Apart from the dubious
quality of the argument that preserving trade secrets is worth
risking the health and safety of millions of people, there are
plenty of safeguards available to ensure that confidential
business information can stay protected while potential safety
risks are disclosed. It is reasonable for a company to want
protection of their sensitive information for a period while
patents are acquired or experimental procedures are tested, but
allowing wholesale permanent exclusion of confidential
business information causes far more harm to our safety
knowledge than the benefit it provides to the company.
Companies should be allowed to request confidential business
information protection for specific information and for a limited
106.
1973).
107.
108.
109.

Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1090 (5th Cir.
Wagner, supra note 102, at 636.
See Denison, supra note 25, at 10027.
Id.
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period. Furthermore, they must be required to provide
justification for their requests, or inappropriate confidential
business information requests will continue.
Finally, for industry to support a reform that requires
them to conduct additional testing, there must be advantages
for the manufacturers that embrace their responsibilities. One
possible enticement might be a limit on the liability of a
manufacturer who completes the most rigorous tests on their
product.110 If a manufacturer completes a full battery of tests
and submits the results to the EPA for the public to see, they
could be granted a cap on their liability for torts arising from
that product. Toxic torts are one of the most expensive
potential liabilities that a company exposes themselves to, and
they would likely jump at the chance to limit their exposure.111
Furthermore, complete testing data would allow the EPA to
have the information they need to regulate the use and
availability of a product, and inform the public about the risks
of a chemical and proper procedures to limit that risk.
C. SHARING THE FRUITS OF OUR LABOR: A REFORMED TSCA
MUST ENSURE HEALTH AND SAFETY RISK DATA IS SHARED
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONALLY
After the EPA creates a new chemical inventory and the
chemicals it contains are subjected to extensive testing to
ensure their safety, the question remains of what to do with the
information contained in the inventory. There are two opposing
options: preserve the secrecy of the data, or publish it freely for
the use of the public. For reasons I will explain, the success and
efficiency of the system requires that the chemical inventory
data become publicly available without restrictions.
If the inventory data is protected and access to the
information within is restricted, companies may feel more
confident about submitting their data. They could be sure that
their internal tests could not be “blown out of proportion” by
consumers or the media, and they would know that their
competitors could not use their own studies against them.
Furthermore, a closed system of confidential test results would
110. See Haemer, supra note 53, at 133.
111. Robert Haemer points out that a similar program is in place for
nuclear power generators through the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(1994). Haemer, supra note 53, at 133.

121_KVINGE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

MORALLY HAZARDOUS

4/4/2011 8:08 AM

331

cure any free rider problems. The first company to test a
common substance incurs a large expense. In a system with
freely available information, the original company’s competitors
can rely on the first test results to obtain approval for their
product as well, without spending the money to conduct the
tests themselves. A closed system, on the other hand, provides
incentives for a company to conduct tests early and enjoy a
monopoly on the market until a competitor can complete their
own tests. Furthermore, companies would not have to be
concerned about the security of their confidential business
information.
On the other hand, a public and open chemical inventory
would help to encourage confidence among consumers of
chemicals. Anyone could log on to a central clearinghouse and
get the full test results for a chemical they were considering
using in their product, and have a complete picture of the level
of safety the product they were considering would provide.
Companies would be encouraged to conduct additional testing
on their competitors’ products, because if they could prove that
a competitor had a product that was less safe or incompletely
tested, they would enjoy a preference in a market that
increasingly desires comprehensive information about the
safety and health risks of various substances.112 An open
system could still provide protection for confidential business
information, but consumers who have a preference for
knowledge of their products may prefer the substance that has
complete disclosure of risks, and disfavor products that are
covered by extensive claims of trade secrets.
An open system has the added advantage of allowing easy
collaboration between the EPA, and state and national
governments. Cooperation with REACH, the European Union’s
chemical control program, will be essential to prevent
duplication of efforts and allow thorough investigation of the
properties of chemicals in the inventory. Keeping with the
principles of federalism present in our government, individual
states should be allowed to enact controls over substances of
concern that the EPA chooses not to attempt to regulate. If
other agencies and governments can be trusted to maintain the
security of any confidential information contained within the
inventory, there is no reason to deny them access.

112. See Wagner, supra note 102, at 640.
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D. ENCOURAGING INNOVATION: WHY STRONGER CONTROLS
WILL NOT STIFLE INVENTION AND PROGRESS
Rather than stifling innovation, a new regulatory scheme
under a reformed TSCA will encourage new developments.
Currently, existing chemicals enjoy a favored status under the
TSCA. Because they are not subject to extensive testing for
safety, an existing chemical may be an appealing choice for a
company looking for a solution to a problem.113 However, the
premise that an existing chemical is automatically safer than a
newly developed substitute has repeatedly been discredited.114
If a reformed TSCA requires all chemicals to be tested, the bias
towards existing chemicals could easily disappear if there are
promising green replacements available.
Furthermore, the rapid pace of nanomaterial development
requires a new approach to the new vs. existing chemical
distinction. Carbon is carbon is carbon, as far as the TSCA is
concerned. Nanomaterials, however, are engineered substances
often produced from a single element (gold, or carbon, or
silicon, for example).115 The physical structure of these
substances is on the molecular scale, and the arrangement of
the molecules that constitute them has a direct impact on the
potential health effects of the nanomaterials on humans. There
is evidence that small carbon nanotubes may act similarly to
asbestos fibers if inhaled,116 but in the eyes of the current
TSCA, the nanotubes are no more dangerous than the graphite
in a pencil lead.
E. CHOOSING AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW: WHY
THE KID SAFE CHEMICAL ACT’S PROPOSED “REASONABLE
CERTAINTY OF NO HARM” STANDARD IS UNWORKABLE AND
UNDESIRABLE FOR A REFORMED TSCA
As mentioned before, a previous proposal to reform the
TSCA was Senator Frank Lautenberg’s Kid Safe Chemical Act
(KSCA). The KSCA attempted to replace the TSCA’s
113. See Bayko, supra note 17, at 254–55.
114. The EPA calls this phenomenon “new chemical bias.” See U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, Regulation of New Chemicals and Chemicals Already on the
Market, US EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oppt/newchems/pubs/newvexist.htm (last
visited Sept. 10, 2010).
115. See Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 361–63 (2007).
116. Id. at 360 n.72.
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“unreasonable risk” standard with a more stringent
requirement of a “reasonable certainty of no harm.”117 The goal
of the KSCA was to reverse the inquiry: rather than requiring
the EPA to prove that a chemical presented an unreasonable
risk before allowing regulation, the manufacturer had to certify
that their testing showed there was a reasonable certainty of
no harm. Industry executives roundly decried this standard as
unworkable and unrealistic.118 Furthermore, the Act only
required the chemical to be certified based on available
knowledge.119 Under the KSCA, just as under the TSCA, a
company might attempt to plead ignorance regarding the
effects of their chemical. Thus, a company could claim that, to
their knowledge, there was a reasonable certainty of no harm if
the testing to actually determine the safety of their product was
too expensive or difficult to complete. The KSCA, in some cases,
would have given the illusion of safety when in reality the
necessary tests had not been completed.
REACH, in contrast, does not create a threshold inquiry at
all. Rather, REACH encourages manufacturers to be proactive
in evaluating the benefits and drawbacks of their product.120 If
there are readily available substitutes to a potentially
dangerous chemical, then REACH requires the manufacturer
and users to use the substitute, unless they can present a
compelling justification for the continued use of the more
dangerous product. The goal of an effective regulatory scheme
should not be to set a minimum floor for safety or a ceiling for
toxicity, but rather to provide the tools for a comprehensive,
individualized determination of the economic, social, and
health effects of allowing the sale, manufacture, and import of
a certain chemical.
IV. CONCLUSION
The time is right for reform of the TSCA. It is politically
popular, supported by industry, and aligned with regulatory
initiatives in the European Union as well. The TSCA in its
current form is ineffective and inaccurate. It gives the
117. Kid Safe Chemicals Act, S. 1391, 109th Cong. § 503(a)(1) (2005); Kid
Safe Chemicals Act, H.R. 4308, 109th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(C) (2005).
118. See American Chemistry Council Statement on the Kid Safe Chemical
Act, May 21, 2008 (describing some Kid-Safe Chemicals Act provisions as
“impractical” and “duplicative”).
119. S. 1391 § 501(a)(1); H.R. 4308 § 501(a)(1).
120. See Applegate, supra note 69, at 745–46.
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appearance of safety to the chemical industry without actually
ensuring that the products of the industry are reliable and safe.
This Note has shown that the most important step of
effective TSCA reform is an overhaul of the inventory that
describes the chemicals that are in use in the United States
today. The inventory must be rebuilt from the ground up,
including only those chemicals that are actually in use, and the
manufacturers of the chemicals should be the parties
responsible for providing the data to populate the inventory.
The resulting database will be complete and give a realistic
picture of the health and safety risks of the chemicals in the
inventory as they are actually used. By sharing the database
with agencies, and state and international governments, we
can increase the effectiveness of the TSCA and ensure that we
are protected from dangerous chemicals.
Congress continues to hold hearings on the TSCA and the
EPA’s ability to regulate toxic substances. It seems that it is
only a matter of time until sweeping reforms are brought to the
TSCA. Effective reform must incorporate some method of
resetting the inventory and closing the toxic data gap. A wellcrafted reform will greatly improve the safety of Americans and
encourage invention of safer substitutes for dangerous
chemicals. Public knowledge of the health risks of individual
chemicals will encourage manufacturers to use safer
alternatives, and reward companies who provide safer
products. Increased cooperation with other agencies, and state,
local, and international governments will improve the quality
of our toxic substances inventory. The road to reform may take
years, but it is important to take the time now to reform an act
that at its inception in 1976 was already out of date.

